(DOWNLOAD) "State Missouri v. Lowell Crockrell" by Supreme Court of Missouri Division 2 # Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: State Missouri v. Lowell Crockrell
- Author : Supreme Court of Missouri Division 2
- Release Date : January 14, 1971
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 57 KB
Description
On July 10, 1970, pursuant to a verdict of a jury rendered on April 28, 1970, appellant was sentenced to two years imprisonment
in the Department of Corrections for the offense of assault with intent to ravish with malice aforethought. The court allowed
appellant four months of his total time spent in jail of nine months and sixteen days (from the time of his arrest on September
24, 1969). Embodied in three points is appellant's complaint that the court should have allowed him credit for all time spent in jail
previous to the sentence. He says that the allowance of the four months jail time will result in his discharge from the Department
of Corrections on September 11, 1971, while allowance of all his jail time would have entitled him to release on March 24,
1971. His argument is first that the denial of part of his jail time is a denial of liberty without due process of law in
that it effectively imposes punishment greater than that assessed by the jury. He cites State v. Carter, Mo., 443 S.W.2d 176;
and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, for that proposition. The Carter case holds merely
that an accused who has served part of an improperly imposed sentence which was later set aside and vacated has a constitutional
right to allowance of credit for the time served on a later, properly imposed sentence, following Simpson, Warden v. Rice,
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. For a similar situation see also State v. Crow, Mo., 388 S.W.2d 817, 821[12].
In the Pearce case, the petitioner's original sentence of 12 to 15 years imprisonment was set aside several years later in
post-conviction proceedings. He was retried, convicted and sentenced to an eight-year prison term, which when added to the
time already spent in prison amounted to a larger total sentence than that originally imposed. The court held that the constitutional
guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully
"credited" in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense. The distinguishing fact here to the above cases
is that there is but one conviction for the one offense - two years.